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Abstract   A two-stage model of interactions within Regional Fishery Manage-
ment Councils was developed in which management targets were set which may
deviate from levels needed to achieve management policy. The first stage mod-
eled bargaining solutions between Council members (harvesters,
conservationists, and government) for management targets, and the second
stage addressed litigation of those solutions. Results indicate that bargaining
power favoring one constituent group could lead to Council outcomes that devi-
ate from management policy. This, in turn, creates incentives for the aggrieved
constituent group to litigate. Tradeoffs between benefits and costs of litigation
and governmental strategies to address these issues are explored.
Key words   Fishery management, cooperative and non-cooperative games.
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Introduction
Management of marine fisheries in the US is conducted through a joint arrangement
between the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS, the federal agency charged
with fisheries management) and Regional Fishery Management Councils. Recently,
these institutional mechanisms have undergone increased public scrutiny (Heinz
2002, Pew 2003, Okey 2003). In particular, the National Academy of Public Admin-
istration (NAPA 2002) reported that
An increasingly large number of fishery management actions are being chal-
lenged in federal courts. This is symptomatic of the system’s growing inability
to reconcile its objectives and perform the functions for which it was created.
Its dual goals of conserving fishing resources and sustaining optimum yields
have become more conflicted. Litigation has grown tenfold since the mid-
1990s, reflecting an order of magnitude increase in fisher and conservationist
dissatisfaction. NMFS’ early, almost unblemished record of success in defend-
ing the system’s management actions has deteriorated to less than 50/50.
NAPA noted that NMFS carries a caseload of more than 100 extant lawsuits, which
consumes a large amount of the agency’s resources. Also, it was noted that manage-
ment has been slow to adapt to new legislatively imposed standards such as
requirements to rebuild overfished stocks, whenever possible, within ten years, and
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that compliance with provisions to establish management criteria has been variable.1
Fishers and conservationist groups regard the system as primarily serving the inter-
ests of the other; commercial and recreational fishers are increasingly at odds. “All
parties recognize that the system has vulnerabilities that can be exploited” (NAPA
2002). This setting establishes the need for analyses of strategic interactions em-
ployed by participants in the fishery management system to: examine the
institutional constraints that have limited the success of fisheries management and
delineate strategies that may be used to mitigate problems.
Game theory applications to natural resource management have contributed to
understanding of incentives and dynamics of fisheries (see Clark [1985] and
Mesterton-Gibbons [1993] for earlier reviews). In particular, recent analyses of
shared and straddling stocks have been conducted using game theory (Naito and
Polasky 1997; Duarte, Brasao, and Pintassilgo 2000; Pintassilgo 2003). The use of
Nash bargaining to model cooperative games has also been an important feature of
the literature (Mesterton-Gibbons 1993, Dinar 2001, Eckert 2003), although analy-
ses using c-games and coalition functions have been useful as well (Lindroos and
Kaitala 2001; Duarte, Brasao, and Pintassilgo 2000; Pintassilgo 2003). However,
much of this literature is directed at the strategic dynamics of individual fishers or
the nations representing fishing fleets, rather than analyses of fisheries management
institutions and how management decisions are made.
The influence of institutional structure on decision-making has been investi-
gated in other bargaining settings (Cai 2000; Steunenberg 1994; Steunenberg,
Schmidtchen, and Koboldt 1999; Nurmi 1998; Tsebelis 1994; Young 1998). Addi-
tionally, notions of power and effects on bargaining have been explored (Straffin
1977; Widgren 1994, 1995; Felsenthal and Machover 1998, 2001; Napel and
Widgren 2001; Widgren and Napel 2002), as well as the interplay between economic
incentives and litigation (Friedman 2000).
This paper examines fishery management strategies in the US by constructing a
two-stage game in which the first stage is a cooperative phase resulting in Nash bar-
gaining solutions (Nash 1953; Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky 1986) and the
second stage is a non-cooperative phase involving litigation of Council actions and
the properties of game solutions. The model was used to explore implications of al-
ternative governmental strategies.
Description of NMFS-Council System
Marine fisheries management in the US is conducted under the auspices of the
Magnusen-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C., Public
Law 94-265, as amended through Oct 1996, hereafter referred to as “the Act”). The
Act establishes eight Regional Fishery Management Councils covering US waters
and marine resources under federal jurisdiction.2 The Councils’ role is to prepare,
1 Of the fish stocks for which data were available to construct management criteria, 36% did not have a
compliant definition of rate of overfishing, and 67% did not have a compliant definition of overfished
status (Thompson, G., A. Lange, P. Mace, and J. Powers. 2002. Compliance of Existing Status Determi-
nation Criteria with the National Standard Guidelines. U.S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, 83 p.).
2 Regional Councils and their jurisdictions are: New England (the States of Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut), the Mid-Atlantic (New York, New Jersey, Delaware,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia), the South Atlantic (North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
and Florida), the Gulf of Mexico (Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas), the Pacific
(California, Oregon, Washington, and Idaho), the North Pacific (Alaska, Washington, and Oregon), the
Caribbean (the US Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico) and the Western Pacific ( the State of Hawaii, Ameri-
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monitor, and revise fishery management plans (FMPs) which are consistent with ten
national standards or goals which include achievement of “optimum yield,” prevent-
ing overfishing, minimizing bycatch, promoting safety, and encompassing
community and other socio-economic factors into their decisions.3 Voting members
of each Council include: (i) the principal State official with marine fishery manage-
ment responsibility for each State in the Council’s jurisdiction; (ii) the Regional
Administrator (regional director) of NMFS; and (iii) a specified number of people
who are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce from a list of candidates supplied
by the Governor of each applicable constituent State.4 The number of voting mem-
bers varies from seven to 21, depending on the Council.
The Act requires that appointees “... must be individuals who, by reason of their
occupational or other experience, scientific expertise, or training, are knowledgeable
regarding the conservation and management, or the commercial or recreational har-
vest, of the fishery resources of the geographical area concerned.” The Act goes on
to specify that the Secretary “... shall, to the extent practicable, ensure a fair and
balanced apportionment, on a rotating or other basis, of the active participants (or
their representatives) in the commercial and recreational fisheries under the jurisdic-
tion of the Council.” In order to monitor this balance, the Act requires that the
membership be assessed annually in terms of the active participants in each such
fishery. Currently, people classified as having either commercial or recreational har-
vesting interests dominate appointees.5
Councils submit FMPs to the Secretary of Commerce, whereupon NMFS
through the Secretary can approve, partially approve, or disapprove the FMP. Hence,
the responsibility for the formulation of the plan typically lies with the Council. The
Secretary has the authority to establish a “Secretarial Plan” if the Council has not
acted or cannot act on an issue in a timely fashion. However, this is rarely invoked.
Upon approval of an FMP, NMFS implements the regulations required to achieve
the goals and objectives of the plan, enforces those regulations, monitors the status
of the fishery and stock relative to the plan’s objectives, and defends the FMP in any
ensuing litigation.
Fishery Council Model
A model of a hypothetical Fishery Management Council was constructed to mimic:
(i) setting of management targets by the Council for a fishery; (ii) governmental
(NMFS) actions when participating in the Council process and when implementing
those targets and regulations; (iii) actions of constituents participating in the Coun-
3 National policy governing management criteria are based on the Act and are established by NMFS in
“National Standard Guidelines” through a public comment and review process. Management criteria in-
clude: the acceptable range for “optimum yield,” maximum criteria for rates of fishing, and minimum
biomass criteria for an overfished stock. Guidelines are advisory in nature and they do not have the full
force and effect of law; thus, Councils have flexibility to deviate from the Guidelines. However, NMFS
(through the Secretary) has the authority to disapprove plans. Therefore, debate remains on how binding
the Guidelines truly are.
4 NMFS’ parent agencies are the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and
the Department of Commerce. Council appointments are determined by the Secretary of Commerce after
consultation with both NMFS and NOAA.
5 The percentage of appointees classified as having commercial or recreational harvesting interests in
2002 ranged from 67–92% for the eight Councils (NMFS 2003. 2002 Report to Congress on Apportion-
ment of Membership on the Regional Fishery Management Councils Pursuant to Section 302(b)(B) of
the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act. Prepared by National Oceanic and Atmo-
spheric Administration Fisheries. January. www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/reg_svcs/councils.htm#congress).Powers 420
cil process; and (iv) constituents’ strategies for subsequently challenging a Council’s
decisions through the use of litigation. The model is parsed into two stages, the first
being termed the Council stage or stage 1, and the second being termed the litiga-
tion stage or stage 2. The term government is used primarily to describe activities of
NMFS, so government and NMFS will be used interchangeably.
A fishery is characterized by biomass dynamics and the extraction of yield from
that biomass. Management targets (T’s) for that yield are determined in two stages
of decision-making. Dynamics of a fish stock and management may be described by:
dB/dt = f(Bt , Yt)          Yt = Ft Bt          At = Ftarget,t Bt, (1)
where Bt = stock size at the beginning of year t; Yt = the realized or actual yield
taken in year t; Ft = the realized or actual exploitation rate in year t; Ftarget,t = man-
agement target exploitation rate during year t; At = the predicted yield in year t when
using the target exploitation rate; and f(Bt, Yt) is a continuous positive function that
is unimodal with f(0, ·) = f(Bcarry capacity, 0) = 0. The scientific advice, At, is the pre-
dicted result of implementing a management target (Ftarget,t) or goal. In this case, the
scientific advice is couched as the predicted target yield that may be taken in year t
with a fishing mortality rate Ftarget,t. The focus of this paper is on the decision-mak-
ing process and not the particular management control policy (in the above, the
management policy is controlled by total allowable catches or TACs). For the most
part, these analyses do not depend on whether the controls are input controls (e.g.,
fishing effort, days at sea, vessel tonnage) or output controls (e.g., TACs) or on the
particular population dynamics model chosen. The essential notion herein is that
management controls are mapped into an estimate of an amount of allowable mortal-
ity and that decisions are made about the risk that might be taken in implementing
that control policy. Therefore, even though equation (1) is characterized as a TAC
management scheme based upon scientific estimates of allowable biological catch,
the terms management target (T) and scientific advice (A) will be used to emphasize
the generality of the fisheries policies being addressed.
The Council collectively converts At into a management target (Tt) by their
choice of a weighting factor, St:
Tt = At St. (2)
The factor St (St ³ 0) is an expression of the degree of risk (relative to the biomass
status of the population of fish) that the Council wishes to take in setting the target;
i.e., how much and in what direction the Council wishes to deviate from At (St = 1
implies that the At is accepted, as is). The weighting factor is constrained by mini-
mum and maximum values (0 £ Smin,t £ St £ Smax,t) that might be established by
acceptable management or legal precedence or by legislative mandate for overall
stock conservation. For example, Smin,t and Smax,t might be defined such that the target
should not deviate more than one standard deviation of scientific uncertainty from At
(Powers and Restrepo 1993).
The Fishery Council model is composed of three types of players or sectors de-
noted by subscript g for government (NMFS), h for the harvesting sectors (h =
1,2,…,n), and c for conservationists or environmental groups (c = 1,2,…,m). The
distinguishing characteristic of sectors defined as harvesters is that they exhibit a
monotonically increasing benefit function (ut,h) in St, whereas conservationists ex-
hibit a monotonically decreasing benefit function in St. The government benefit
function monotonically decreases with deviation from At; i.e., with deviations from
St = 1. Clearly, there are instances in actual Council interactions in which harvesting
sectors have exhibited decreasing benefits over S (for example, when stocks areStrategies in Fishery Management 421
underexploited and the sector does not have the capacity to fulfill a larger alloca-
tion; yet they do not want to create incentives to allow expansion of other harvesting
sectors). Nevertheless, the names harvesters and conservationists and government
will be used to denote any sector which exhibits benefit characteristics mentioned
above, without pejorative interpretations of this nomenclature.
Stage 1: Council
The stage 1 model is designed to mimic the hypothetical Council’s designation of
management targets for mortality of a fish stock. Typically, this is done as an annual
target-setting process. However, the analysis may also be interpreted in the context
of longer-term Council activities, such as the development of FMPs, which typically
occur on two- to five-year time scales. Nevertheless, the term years will be used to
refer to the time scale.
The collective process of converting At into a management target is modeled
here as a cooperative game leading to a generalized Nash Bargaining solution (St
*),
where St
* is the solution to:
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subject to pt,h + pt,c = 1, where pt,h and pt,c are linear transformations of St between
the minimum and maximum values (0 £ Smin,t £ St £ Smax,t). The linear scale of p is
increasing in St for harvesting sectors, decreasing in St for conservation sectors, in-
creasing in St for the governmental sector when St < 1, and decreasing in St for the
governmental sector when St > 1:
pt,h = [St – Smin,t]/[Smax,t – Smin,t] pt,c = [Smax,t – St]/[Smax,t – Smin,t]
pt,g = [St – Smin,t]/[1 – Smin,t] when St £ 1
pt,g = [Smax,t – St]/[Smax,t – 1] when St > 1.
Benefit derived by sector i is described by the function ut,i(Si); rt,i is the bargaining
power available to player i (0 £ rt,i £ 1, Si rt,i = 1). The variable dt,i is player i’s
threat point; i.e., the point where the bargaining process breaks down and player i
defects from the cooperative stage, shifting to stage 2 (litigation). Threat points will
be discussed further in the context of stage 2.
One interpretation of bargaining power, rt,i, is the relative number of individual
votes on the Council of people with like-minded benefit functions. Using that defi-
nition, rt,i would be the same for each individual on the Council and the collective
power of a sector would depend upon the number of representatives on the Council
that are aligned with that sector’s viewpoint. Alternatively, bargaining power may be
thought of as a more abstract concept encompassing such factors as powers of per-
suasion, lobbying by sectors that may or may not be represented on the Council, and
legislative interaction. For example, NMFS represents just one vote of seven to 21,
depending on the Council. However, NMFS’ role as implementer of the target some-
times means that their influence exceeds a rt,g of 5–14% indicated by the relative
number of votes, alone. Similarly, conservationists are usually not well represented
on Councils, yet they may still have influence through public hearings and lobbying.
The more abstract concept of bargaining power when there is bargaining on behalfPowers 422
of constituents appears to be more useful in interpreting the results of these analyses
than a definition based solely upon the relative number of votes (Cai 2000).
Conditions for the Nash bargaining solution are specified by axioms of: invari-
ance to equivalent utility representations (that the outcome cannot depend on the
arbitrary units used to measure benefits); Pareto-efficiency (that the bargaining solu-
tion has exhausted all opportunities for making all players better off); symmetry
(players are distinguished by their benefit functions, threat points, and bargaining
powers, alone); and independence from irrelevant alternatives; i.e., that the outcome
of a bargain cannot depend on the availability of alternatives that are not in fact cho-
sen when players have the option of doing so (Gintis 2000). Application of the Nash
bargaining solution to the cooperative Council phase of this analysis, implicitly as-
sumes that these axioms are fulfilled.
Stage 2: Litigation
After the Council process has transpired (resulting in either an agreed target or the
breakdown in negotiations), each non-governmental sector decides whether to chal-
lenge the decision or not. Challenges may occur in various forms including
litigation, threats of litigation, and legislative interventions; however, litigation is
the only challenge being considered in stage 2. Characteristics of the litigation stage
are: (i) power available to each sector in the litigation phase (including that of
NMFS) may be quite different from the bargaining power exhibited in the Council
stage; and (ii) sector objectives may be different from those of stage 1, especially
for government. Based on these characteristics, the litigation process was modeled
as a multiplicative adjustment to the results emanating from the Council, thus equa-
tion (2) is redefined as:
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where wt,i is the litigation power that sector i has during a litigation stage and Lt,i is
the litigation strategy. When wt,i = 0, this implies that sector i does not participate in
the litigation. Note that NMFS is the sector being sued, so it has no choice but to
participate in litigation that has been initiated by another sector (wt,g > 0). The vari-
able Ot refers to outcomes; i.e., the joint results of the Council process (St) and
litigation (Jt).
The litigation process as modeled in equation (4) is resolved by balancing two
competing principles: (i) that there is a rebuttable presumption that the results of the
Council process were justified (that Jt should equal one) unless arguments are pre-
sented to indicate otherwise; or (ii) that the advice on the targets needed to
implement policy should be accepted (accept At, thus, Jt should equal 1/St), unless
successfully argued otherwise. The principles are weighted equally in equation (4)
[by the factor 1/2 (1 + 1/St)]. Equal weighting of the two principles is equivalent to
the expected value of a random process in which a court, sympathetic to one of theStrategies in Fishery Management 423
two principles, is equally likely to be encountered. The outcome of litigation will
depend upon which of these two principles resonate with the court.
The outcome of litigation in equation (4) is determined by the litigation power
of the non-governmental litigants relative to the power of all the participating liti-
gants, including government. If no non-governmental sector makes a challenge, then
Jt = 1 and the target specified during the Council process is not modified. The impli-
cation of equation (4) is that the objective of NMFS during stage 2 is not the same
as their objective during stage 1. In stage 2, NMFS’ objective is to defend the Coun-
cil process (defend the Council decision) rather than to minimize deviations from A,
as in stage 1. This change in objectives exemplifies NMFS’ dual (and sometimes
conflicting) role as both implementer of policy (Jt = 1/St) and as defender of the
Council process (Jt = 1).
Given that litigation occurs and that there is no marginal cost to a sector of us-
ing a particular argument, then the best strategy for harvesting sectors is to argue for
the largest L they can (Smax,t) and for conservation sectors to argue for the smallest L
they can (Smin,t). Combining factors, equation (4) may be simplified into: Ot = St Jt =
1/2 Gt (1 + St).
Each sector derives net benefits from each possible outcome. The net benefits,
NBt,i(Ot), of the joint council-litigation process to a sector i are the benefits derived
from the joint outcome reduced by their litigation costs (Ct,i), if they participate in
the litigation:
NBt,i(Ot)=   ut,i [1/2 Gt (1 + St)] – Ct,i with litigation (5)
= ut,i(St) without litigation.
The term benefits refers to the function ut,i(St), whereas net benefits refers to
NBt,i(Ot). Note that litigation costs are measured in the same units as benefits.
Council Game
Using stage 1 and 2 models, the strategic interaction may now be expressed as fol-
lows: each non-governmental sector chooses to participate in the cooperative stage
(Stage 1) or not. If they choose to cooperate then the outcome of Stage 1 is the gen-
eralized Nash bargaining solution obtained by those players that participate. If they
choose not to cooperate (i.e., defect), then their bargaining power factor is with-
drawn from equation (3) and the outcome is the Nash bargaining solution for the
remaining participants. If no non-governmental participants remain then the Council
process breaks down and the outcome is specified by government to be equivalent to
At through preemption of the Council’s authority via the development of a “Secre-
tarial Plan.”
NMFS has the power to stop or delay the Council process by indicating that an
action cannot be approved (government defects, denoted here by the term disap-
proved). The outcome under those circumstances is the target that exists from the
previous time period; i.e., Tt-1. Then using equations (4), Ot = St Jt = Tt–1/At. When
NMFS disapproves the Council stage, the reasons for doing so are to strengthen the
legal arguments and to delay any ensuing litigation. This is modeled by reducing the
litigation power of non-governmental litigants by a factor, d, and by discounting net
benefits to non-governmental sectors due to delays by the factor, t, if there is litiga-
tion. If g disapproves and there is litigation, then non-governmental net benefits are
discounted by t,Powers 424
NBt,i,J(Ot)=   ut,i(Gt,d) with no litigation (6)
= t [ ut,i(Gt,d) – Ct,i ] with litigation     i = h,c    0 £ t £ 1,
and governmental net benefits are:
NBt,g,J(Ot)= ut,g(Tt-1 /At) with no litigation (7)
= ut,g(Gt,d) – Ct,g with litigation.
If government disapproves and non-governmental sectors choose to litigate, then the
question becomes: which principle are they litigating [that At is adopted (St = 1) or
that the Council process is accepted (Jt = 1)]? Since the Council has not made a de-
termination, litigation after disapproval is assumed to be addressing governmental-
Council delays in implementing policy (St = 1), hence the choice of equation (6).
Non-governmental sectors do not have the power to unilaterally stop the Coun-
cil stage in this model. Therefore, a sector’s threat point during the bargaining stage
is defined to be the same as that of the government; i.e., Smin,t and Smax,t. Alterna-
tively, defection by a harvesting or conservation sector might be a mechanism to
force government to disapprove. In that case, threat points of the non-governmental
sectors would be the outcomes of the game when government disapproves and, thus,
stage 1 cooperative solutions would be dependent on that expected outcome. How-
ever, the complexity introduced is not warranted in this analysis and that approach
was not taken here.
The structure of the two-stage game includes parameters that are rather abstract
in concept (e.g., bargaining power, litigation power, litigation costs, risk profiles). It
is not expected that these parameters would be estimated for any Council or group
of constituents. Therefore, the usefulness of the model is in its prescriptive nature,
rather than its predictive ability. The analyses herein explore the conditions that
would force certain kinds of outcomes. From these results, inferences will be drawn
as to the reasons that the current situation has occurred. Additionally, the strategies
that participants (particularly government) might take to ameliorate some of those
outcomes are explored.
Properties of Stage 1 Cooperative Solutions
First-order conditions for the Nash Bargaining solution (3), St
* are:
mt,g + mt,h + mt,c = 0, (8)
where:
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The value mt,h is the mean over all harvesting sectors (weighted by bargaining
power) of the marginal change in benefits relative to the benefit function. Similarly,
mt,c is the mean over all conservation sectors, and mt,g is the relative marginal change
for the governmental sector. Note from equation (3) that:
uNt,h(St
*) and mt,h > 0 (9)
uNt,c(St
*) and mt,c < 0
uNt,g(St
*) and mt,g < 0   iff St
* > 1, and
uNt,g(St
*) and mt,g > 0   iff St
* < 1.
Let X be the point where mt,h(X) + mt,c(X) = 0. Note that bargaining power, as ex-
pressed in equation (8) is a relative weighting of the marginal change in benefits.
Therefore, the relative weighting between harvesters and conservationists in equa-
tion (8) is independent of governmental bargaining power; i.e., mt,h(X) and mt,c(X) are
independent of governmental power. For all St > X, then mt,h(St) + mt,c(St) > 0. Hence,
if St
* is a solution in which St
* > X, then mt,g(St
*) < 0 and St
* must be greater than 1
[from equations (8) and (9)]. Conversely, if St < X, then mt,h(St) + mt,c(St) < 0 and if St
*
is a solution in which St
* < X, then mt,g(St
*) > 0 and St
* < 1. Therefore, whether or not
the solution is less than one or greater than one is determined by h’s and c’s charac-
teristics [mt,h(St) and mt,c(St)], independent of g’s characteristics [mt,g(St)]. Solutions
that deviate from At (St
* > 1 or St
* < 1) are determined by the characteristics (benefit
functions and the relative bargaining powers) of the harvesting and conservation
sectors. Governmental characteristics [bargaining power (rg) and the shape of the
benefits function (dug(St
*)/dSt)] are not sufficient to convert the solution from one in
which St
* < 1 to one in which St
* > 1, or vice versa. Government participation only
mitigates the relative positions of the other participants, drawing the outcome back
to the policy position of St
* = 1. Governmental characteristics can force solutions at
St
* = 1, but they cannot force deviation of St
* from 1 against the balance of the con-
stituents. This feature of the model is not unreasonable in that the NMFS
representative on the Council is often reluctant to make arguments that deviate too
much from St = 1, because those arguments become part of the record of proceed-
ings which may be referred to in subsequent litigation.
Model Results
The following assumes that there is one harvesting sector (denoted h) and one con-
servation sector (denoted c) for single-period outcomes (one realization of stage 1
and stage 2). Also, it is assumed that a sector’s decision to litigate or not is made
after the results of cooperative stage 1 are known, and that all sectors have perfect
information about all parameter values. Define the following notation:
St,all = sol{mt,h + mt,c + mt,g = 0};   St,h = sol{mt,h + mt,g = 0} (10)
St,c = sol{mt,c + mt,g = 0}
Gt,all = (Smin,t)wc/(wc + wh + wg) (Smax,t) wh/(wc + wh + wg)
Gt,all,* = (Smin,t)dwc/(dwc + dwh + wg) (Smax,t)dwh/(dwc + dwh + wg)
Gt,h = (Smax,t)wh/(wh + wg);   Gt,h,* = (Smax,t)dwh/(d wh + wg)
Gt,c = (Smin,t)wc/(wc + wg);    Gt,c,* = (Smin,t)dwc/(d wc + wg)      0 £ d £ 1.Powers 426
The notation St,all stands for the stage 1 generalized Nash bargaining solution when
all sectors (harvesters, conservationists, and government) participate; St,h occurs
when only harvesters and government participate; and St,c occurs when only conser-
vationists and government participate. Similarly, Gt,all stands for the stage 2
litigation factor (4) when all sectors participate in litigation, Gt,h when only harvest-
ers and government participate, and Gt,c when only conservationists and government
participate. Similarly, Gt,i,* denotes participation in litigation after g disapproves,
where non-governmental sectors’ litigation power is reduced by d. Outcomes of the
joint Council-litigation process for each sector’s strategy are given in figure 1.
The analyses that follow address conditions which would induce a sector to co-
operate or defect, litigate or not litigate, approve or disapprove; i.e., under what
circumstances would selected cells in figure1 produce rational solutions to Council
interactions? The discussion will focus on actions taken by the sectors (particularly
the conservation sector) when the joint cooperative solution, St,all, would have been
greater than one, recognizing that the arguments are symmetric and could have been
equally well developed for the harvesting sector when St,all < 1. Note that if we as-
sume that Smin,t < 1 < Smax,t, then:
St, c < St, all < St, h;    Gt,c < Gt, all < Gt, h;    and Gt,c < 1 < Gt,h (11)
for all positive bargaining and litigation powers.
Figure 1.  The structure of the Council game is given with cell-by-cell outcomes
(Ot = St Jt). Net benefits to sector i will be: NBt,i(Ot) = ui(Ot) – Ci,
if sector i litigates and NBt,i(Ot) = ui(Ot), if it does not.Strategies in Fishery Management 427
Sectors c and h Cooperate, g Approves: When Should c or h Litigate?
Consider the subgame in which c and h cooperate, and g approves (subgame Q1 in
figure 1). When St,all > 1, then Nash solutions are:
c litigates, h does not, when: (12)
ut,c[1/2 Gt,c (1 + St, all)] – Ct,c > ut,c[St, all], and
ut,h[1/2 Gt,c (1 + St, all)] > ut,h[1/2 Gt,all (1 + St, all)] – Ct,h
h litigates, c does not, when:
ut,h[1/2 Gt,h (1 + St, all)] – Ct,h > ut,h[St, all], and
ut,c[1/2 Gt,h (1 + St, all)] > ut,c[1/2 Gt,all (1 + St, all)] – Ct,c
both c and h litigate, when:
ut,h[1/2 Gt,c (1 + St, all)]  < ut,h[1/2 Gt,all (1 + St, all)] – Ct,h , and
ut,c[1/2 Gt,all (1 + St, all)] – Ct,c  > ut,c[St, all].
Note if St,all > 1, then 1/2 (1 + St,all) < St,all ; and from equation (11), then Gt,c < 1.
Thus, 1/2 Gt,c (1 + St,all) < St,all and 1/2 Gt,c (1 + St,all) < 1/2 Gt,all (1 + St,all). Since the
benefit functions are monotonic:
ut,c[1/2 Gt,all (1 + St, all)]  > ut,c[St, all] , and
ut,h[1/2 Gt,all (1 + St, all)]  > ut,h[1/2 Gt,c (1 + St, all)].
Thus, given St,all > 1, c has some motivation to litigate if the gains in ut,c by doing so
will exceed the costs of litigation; similarly, h has an incentive to combat c’s litiga-
tion by joining the litigation because they can mitigate losses due to c’s litigation by
doing so, unless their costs of litigation are too high. Sector c’s original choice to
litigate will produce a better net benefit to itself, if its litigation costs are low or
their litigation power (wc) is large relative to that of the harvesters or government, or
the harvest sector’s litigation costs are high. When harvester litigation power is low
and their per-litigation costs are high, their best strategy is to let NMFS defend the
Council’s decision and not join the litigation. Relationships equivalent to equation
(12) exist for subgame Q2 (figure 1) where h cooperates, c defects, and government
approves. In this instance St,h replaces St,all in equation (12).
From NMFS’ viewpoint, the stage 1 objective is to develop cooperative solutions
which are close to St,all being equal to one. The mechanisms to do this would be to have
government threat points near St = 1, for NMFS to have relatively large bargaining
power, for NMFS’ benefit function to be strongly risk prone, or for the bargaining power
of non-governmental sectors to be balanced between harvesters and conservationists.
Sector h Cooperates and g Approves: When Should c Defect?
When would it have been better for c to defect rather than to cooperate, i.e., move
from subgame Q1 to subgame Q2 in figure1? Suppose, again, that if all sectors co-
operated there would be a solution to the Council stage where St,all > 1. Using the
relationships of equation (11), NBt,c(·) of each outcome cell of Q2 is less than NBt,c(·)
of the comparable cell in Q1. Conversely, NBt,h(·) is greater for each cell in Q2 com-
pared to Q1. Thus, if h cooperates, then c is better off by cooperating, as well.
Hence, c would not choose to defect.Powers 428
Both h and c Defect, g Approves
Are there conditions under which both c and h would defect? Assuming St,all would
have been greater than 1, then it is always in h’s interest to cooperate regardless of
whether either sector litigates afterward [Q2 versus Q4 and versus Q3]. Using sym-
metric arguments, c will not defect if St,all < 1, as well. Thus, it is never in c’s
interest to defect if the cooperative decision would have been St,all < 1, and it is
never in h’s interest to defect if the cooperative decision would have been St,all > 1.
If St,all = 1, then subgame Q1 and subgame Q4 are identical; i.e., outcomes when
both c and h cooperate are identical to those in which they both defect.
Government (g) Disapproves
What criteria are used for governmental disapproval? The act of disapproval shifts
the game from subgame Q1 in figure1 to subgame Q5. When governmental threat
points (Smin,t or Smax,t) are exceeded, then the game is delayed while the arguments are
reevaluated. Under this reasoning, NMFS will not disapprove unless subgame Q5
results in a better outcome to NMFS than that of Q1. This, in turn, implies that
government’s threat points should be defined by the outcome of Q5, since a bar-
gainer will gain benefits at the expense of the other players when the bargainer’s
fallback position improves (Gintis 2000).
An alternative interpretation (which was used in the model and in figure1) is
that the decision to disapprove is driven by government’s net benefits, NBg(·), rather
than by the outcome of the bargaining process. Thus, disapproval is driven more by
governmental costs of litigation, Cg; expected improvements in the legal position
during delays (d); and in costs of delays (t) to the other sectors, than it is by simple
benefits, ug(St). Therefore, if governmental litigation costs are high, then the status
of existing management (Tt–1/At in subgame Q5) takes on less weight in the decision
to disapprove or not. This is the tactic of the Regulatory Streamlining Program
(RSP) approach.6
Analysis of Sensitivities
In what follows, benefit functions for the three sectors (i = h,c,g) were specified by:
ui(St) = pt,i
ai      0 £ ui(St) £ 1,
where pt,i is a linear transformation of St between zero and one, as defined in equa-
tion (3). In this formulation, the risk profile was fully determined by the parameter,
ai: when 0 < ai < 1, this corresponds to a risk averse benefit function and ai > 1
corresponds to risk prone characteristics. Also, the scaling of the benefit functions
6 One strategy chosen by NMFS to combat the proliferation of litigation was an RSP, in which emphasis
was placed on implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). “The RSP is another
new development within NOAA Fisheries that promises to improve the fishery management process
over the next several years. Building additional NEPA expertise within the agency, along with front-
loading the consideration of complex legal and policy issues earlier in the rulemaking process, are key
components of RSP.” The program is designed to improve performance and efficiency by streamlining
the regulatory process and improving the connection to constituents. (Implementing the Sustainable
Fisheries Act: Achievements from 1996 to the Present. June 2003. NMFS, NOAA, USDOC.
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[ui(St)] between zero and one makes it easier to assign litigation “costs” (Ci’s) when
evaluating sensitivities.
Parameter sensitivities of the Nash solution when all three sectors participate
(figure 2) show that increasing bargaining power (ri) or risk prone behavior (ai > 1)
will benefit a sector. The more risk averse a participant is, the worse that that par-
ticipant does in bargaining (Gintis 2000). If a Council solution is desired in which
all sectors participate and the solution is near one (St » 1), then sector characteristics
Figure 2.  Nash bargaining solutions when all three sectors participate (St,all),
using alternative conservationist bargaining power (rc) and risk profile (ac).
Notes:
A) using parameters: ah = 0.3, ag = 0.2; dc = 1.5, dh = 0.7, dg = 0.7,1.5; and rg/rh = 0.25 (where rg + rc + rh = 1).
B) as in A, but governmental to harvester bargaining power ratio increased (rg/rh = 4 instead of 0.25).
C) as in A, but governmental benefit function (ug) was risk prone (ag = 1.2 instead of 0.3).
D) as in A, but harvester benefit function (uh) was risk prone (ag = 1.2 instead of 0.3).Powers 430
that would achieve this are: high conservationist bargaining power (relative to har-
vesters) or more risk prone conservationist benefit functions. Experience indicates
that seldom are these conditions met (see footnote 5 and Okey 2003).
Although risk prone benefit functions were evaluated (figure 2), it is expected
that risk averse functions (where ai < 1) are common (Roth 1995). Clearly, the govern-
mental goal of complying with the wishes of Congress and making the Council process
“work” has led to behavior that is consistent with governmental risk aversion.
A graphical example of a particular subgame Q1 solution (figures 1 and 3) shows
the relationship between litigation and net benefits in the model. Referring to figure 3,
assume that neither sector h nor sector c litigates; then the net benefit (or payoff) to each
sector is given by the open square and circle. Sector h has no motivation to unilaterally
litigate, since by doing so, its payoff would be less (the darkly filled square on the right
of figure 3 shows less net benefit for h than the open square). However, c has an incen-
tive to unilaterally litigate because doing so will increase their net benefit (the darkly
filled circle on the left of figure 3 shows more net benefit for c than the open circle).
Sector h has no incentive to join c’s litigation, since by doing so, h would be worse off
(the lightly filled square shows less net benefit than the darkly filled square on the left).
Therefore, the solution in this example is for c to litigate and for h not to litigate.
Figure 3.  An example of net benefits (NB) to sectors h and c with and without litigation.
Notes: NBh is an increasing function of St x Jt; whereas, NBc is a decreasing function of St Jt. The two
upper curves are net benefits when there is no litigation; the lower curves are NB’s when there is litiga-
tion (the lower curves have been reduced by litigation costs, Cc and Ch). Squares are outcomes for h.
Circles are outcomes for c. Open symbols denote outcomes when neither litigates. Darkly filled symbols
are when one sector litigates and the other does not. Lightly filled symbols depict outcomes when both
litigate. In this example (using subgame Q1 of figure 1, parameters in table 1 and Cc = Ch = 0.1), the
game solution occurs when c litigates and h does not (denoted by the left-most, darkly filled symbols).Strategies in Fishery Management 431
The cost of litigation to each of the three sectors affects the outcome and solu-
tion of the game (figures 4–6 using parameters of table 1 and Cg = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3,
respectively). When litigation costs are small, it is beneficial for both c and h to liti-
gate (figure 4E), and the solutions end up in the Q1 subgame (figure 4C). As
harvester litigation costs increase, harvesters drop out of the litigation and their net
Figure 4.  Game solutions using parameters given in table 1
with governmental litigation cost Cg = 0.1.
Notes:
A) solution outcomes (Ot).
B) net benefits to g.
C) subgame solution; for example, a value on the vertical axis of “5” refers to the subgame Q5.
D) net benefits to c.
E) litigation.
F) net benefits to h. Note that the order of some axes have been reversed for easier viewing.Powers 432
benefits decrease, while those of conservationists increase (figures 4F, 4D). Still
within this range of litigation costs, outcomes favor harvesters (Ot > 1, figure 4A)
and governmental net benefits are relatively high (figure 4B). If a sector can reduce
its litigation cost, then litigation is more likely to occur (figures 4E, 5E, 6E).
When governmental litigation costs are higher than in table 1 and figure 4, then
the game moves toward subgame Q5 solutions (figures 5C and 6C); i.e., where gov-
ernment disapproves. However, this is not necessarily translated into outcomes
where Ot is near to one [recall that disapproval results in an outcome returning to the
previous regulation (Tt-1/At)]. However, disapproval eliminates some of the condi-
tions under which litigation would be a beneficial strategy for a harvester or
conservationists; therefore, disapproval decreases the frequency of litigation (figures
5E, 5F).
Figure 5.  Game solutions using parameters given in table 1,
with government’s litigation costs Cg = 0.2.Strategies in Fishery Management 433
Governmental strategies which might be used to improve their position may be
characterized as: (i) an RSP strategy7 where governmental litigation costs are high
such that subgame Q5 would be the solution in most cases (this is like the conditions
in figure 6); (ii) a strategy where the Council and government accepts At as it is given
and implements it accordingly (government sets St = 1; equivalent to subgame Q4 in fig-
ure 1). This is referred to as an SA strategy; (iii) an individual incentives (II) strategy
where harvester and conservationist bargaining powers are more equally distributed
(like in figure 2B). An II strategy would include one in which harvester incentives are
shifted (such as through the implementation of individual fishing quotas [IFQs]) or
when there is a rebalance of Council membership; and (iv) a risky RSP strategy
(RRSP) in which NMFS accepts a greater risk of litigation in order to accelerate the
regulatory process having somewhat reduced litigation costs (as in figure 5).
Discussion and Conclusions
An important premise of this analysis is that participants in the Council-litiga-
tion process are motivated by outcomes and costs. Therefore, while litigation
may be directed at weak points in the management process, the decision to litigate
or not is driven by the opportunity for constituents to improve their position
versus the cost of doing so. A corollary of this premise is that legally shoring
up a single element of the management process will not remove the participant’s
motivation for better outcomes. Thus, incentives for subsequent litigation re-
main, if outcomes are insufficient and if other legal arguments can be found.
7 NMFS and NOAA’s General Council (GC) are not lock-step actors on all fisheries issues. There is ten-
sion between a NMFS Regional Administrator and NOAA GC over objectives to implement needed
management measures versus objectives to minimize litigation and to the likelihood of losing litigation.
The authority that balances these factors is contested, as well. For these reasons, litigation costs were
modeled separately in a net benefits function NBg(.), rather than integrating it into benefits, ug(.), so as to
isolate these issues, particularly for evaluation of RSP-type strategies.
Table 1
Base Set of Parameters used in Figures 4–6
Benefit Threat Bargaining Litigation
Profile (ai) Point (di)a Power (ri) Power (wi)
Sector Game Parameters
Sector h 0.3 0.7 0.73 0.1
Sector c 0.3 1.5 0.09 0.1
Sector g 0.3b 0.7, 1.5 0.18 0.6
Litigation Parameters
Litigation Power Constituent Benefits Tt-1/At
Discount (d) Discount (t)
0.5 0.5 1.34
a t threat points of h and c are the same as for g; i.e. Smin and Smax.
b ag assumed to be the same when St > 1 and when St £ 1.Powers 434
The game specified by the parameters in table 1 exemplifies the situation in
which one sector is more influential in the Council, leading to management tar-
gets that deviate substantially from the scientific advice. A natural response by
opposing sectors to this situation would be to initiate a litigation strategy, and,
indeed, that occurred (NAPA 2002). However, a litigation strategy only became
viable when litigation costs to that sector were reduced. One mechanism to re-
duce litigation costs for a sector is to develop a national program of litigation
with economies of scale and, thus, lower per-litigation costs (NAPA 2002). Sec-
tors that litigate on local issues are at a disadvantage, since they typically
cannot achieve the same economies.
Litigation may be a mechanism to provide better outcomes for NMFS by bring-
ing management targets more in line with the scientific advice. But from a practical
Figure 6.  Game solutions using parameters given in table 1,
with government’s litigation costs Cg = 0.3.Strategies in Fishery Management 435
perspective, management by the courts can be a blunt instrument with results that
may move too far too quickly (NAPA 2002). Also, benefits of litigation to NMFS
are reduced by the costs of that litigation.
Much of NMFS’ litigation has been directed at process issues (such as NEPA)
rather than determinations of policy (NAPA 2002). In other words, issues about the
status of stocks, status criteria, and associated scientific uncertainty are not the fo-
cus of most litigation.8 When process issues are being litigated, a constituent has
three motivations: (i) they would prefer the Council provide an outcome that is more
beneficial to them; (ii) that, if the Council process had adhered to procedural man-
dates more faithfully, then the Council would have come to a decision more
favorable to that constituent; and (iii) that the court may change the outcome favor-
ably (i.e., the court may actively change management, rather than reverting the issue
back to NMFS to improve the process). Litigation typically focuses on the second
motivation (with better procedures, the Council would have arrived at a different po-
sition). While these legal arguments are used, the analyses presented here suggest
that improving the process would not substantially change outcomes without con-
comitant changes in the bargaining power and risk behavior of non-governmental
sectors.
Responses to high frequencies of litigation may include several alternatives,
such as regulatory streamlining, changing individual incentives, or developing Sec-
retarial Plans. Benefit to NMFS of an RSP-like strategy will depend on how much
weight is placed on the outcome (the management target) versus cost of litigation.
Assigning high litigation costs to NMFS encourages strategies in which litigation is
avoided, while removing flexibility to achieve more favorable outcomes to the fish
stock and the fishery when opportunities to do so exist.
Rebalancing of Council participation (an II strategy) is another mechanism to
address both the Council game and litigation. This strategy was termed individual
incentives in order to emphasize the goal of rebalancing incentives of the participat-
ing sectors, rather than just directly rebalancing the sectors. Shifting incentives is
implicitly an argument for rights-based management instruments such as IFQs. The
argument is that with fishing rights assigned to individuals, economic conditions
may be created in which some individuals receive more income with a smaller over-
all fishery-wide quota (Tt) because they can sell their share at a higher value and/or
their per unit cost of harvesting is reduced. Hence, these individuals would be better
off when the overall quota is smaller (although these circumstances will shift with
economic conditions). In the terminology of the Council game, conditions will be
created in which some harvesters exhibit “conservation-like” benefit functions, or
indeed, “government-like” benefit functions. Of course, directly rebalancing the
Council will achieve the same results; thus, both situations might be addressed by an
II strategy.
Okey (2003) argued specifically for a policy of direct rebalancing of the Coun-
cils. However, direct rebalancing of Councils would likely require changes in
legislation (Cloutier 1996). Okey suggested “alternative experiments” to approach
rebalancing including: domination by broader interests; domination by recreational
interests or equal representation. The present author is less sanguine that domination
by any constituent interest would produce desired results. Results, here, showed that
dominant bargaining power by any constituency, be they harvesters or conservation-
8 However, debates about scientific uncertainty still ensue throughout Council processes and can influ-
ence bargaining solutions. Also, scientific reviews mandated externally (for example by Congress) can
achieve similar outcomes for a constituency as litigation (delays, possible dilution of decisions), but
without litigation costs.Powers 436
ists, would contribute to deviations from management policy and create incentives
for litigation. Additionally, it is unclear that recreational groups can be characterized
as having “conservationist” benefit functions.
Competition between harvesting groups can accentuate difficulties, as well.
Council membership typically includes representatives of various harvesting sectors
(commercial versus recreational; trawl versus handline; inshore versus offshore; pri-
vate recreational boats versus charter boats). But as long as their benefits functions
are increasing in St, bargaining solutions, like in figure 2, are likely to ensue. In-
deed, competition between harvesting sectors can exacerbate the Council process by
creating a small “race for fish” game within the Council, where harvesting sectors
are forced to argue for a larger allocation or for implementation tactics which favor
their allocation for fear that another sector’s actions will decrease their realized
share. This can make the benefit functions more risk prone (a sector reaps more ben-
efits from a unit increase in St than otherwise). This is perhaps most evident in the
competition between recreational and commercial interests on some Councils. In-
deed, this competition was likely the motivation within the Act to balance “active
participants (or their representatives) in the commercial and recreational fisheries.”
However, the “balance” mentioned in the Act appears to address allocation con-
cerns, rather than stewardship responsibilities.
An SA strategy essentially assigns NMFS authority to implement the scientific
advice independent of the Council. Not surprisingly, the model as it was constructed
showed that such a system performed well in terms of policy and minimizing litiga-
tion. If an SA-like strategy were desired, then one way to obtain it would be to
constrain the feasible bargaining solution so that outcomes could not deviate much
from the SA. Thus, the solution to the Q1 subgame in figure 1 would not differ much
from the Q4 subgame. Mechanisms for government to do this are: for government to
have more power in the bargaining phase, for governmental threat points to be near
the management target, for government to disapprove on the basis of outcomes
rather than process, or for government to have a risk prone benefit function. Of
these, the latter seems the least feasible. To some degree, the management system is
moving in this direction. Constraints on Council actions are presently being imple-
mented by additional requirements being added to National Standard Guidelines and
through the development of case law. Indeed, many Council members would argue
that NMFS is adding too many constraints. However, the addition of more con-
straints to assure that a Council outcome would be close to an SA strategy might be
considered to be disingenuous. If an SA strategy were desired, a more transparent
way to achieve it would be by implementing such a strategy directly, rather than by
trying to manipulate the Council system to achieve the same ends.
The assignment of management authority for determining target decisions di-
rectly to government or to a scientific group is not unprecedented in the world
(Cochrane 1999). However, it would be naive to expect (or trust) that government
would operate this system sustainably without some checks and balances. One such
check might be for the Councils to maintain their authority to make allocation deci-
sions and to maintain their oversight of the provision of scientific advice through
their Scientific and Statistical Committees. Additional mechanisms for legal and po-
litical accountability for implementing policy would need to be ensured.
The thrust of this study is that the structure of the institutional decision-making
framework can often force outcomes with certain characteristics. The present Coun-
cil management structure has created incentives that result in bargaining and
litigation outcomes that deviate from target management policies. These incentives
occur regardless of what the management policy is. To address this, debate and
analysis of alternative fisheries management approaches should be encouraged.Strategies in Fishery Management 437
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